Summary
In recent epistemological literature, epistemic entitlement is understood as a personal epistemic status that does not require elaborate justi catory activity on behalf of the entitled individual. It is nevertheless internalist in a weaker sense, since it is said to be grounded in perceptual experiences. It seems, however, that the conditions under which an epistemic right holds should, like in cases of most other rights, be publicly observable, because they have implications for the ways others are required to treat the entitled individual.
erefore I suggest an alternative to the weakly internalist conception of epistemic entitlement as based on mental episodes. I show how we can construe epistemic rights as being based on external conditions that are publicly observable. is social externalist approach is then defended against internalist and externalist challenges.
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logists. ey immediately concern the relation between a belief and its truth.
In the last two decades, the concept of epistemic entitlement has gained some attention in the epistemological literature, notably in attempts to explain perceptual knowledge. e idea that the central epistemic notion is one of an epistemic right seems initially attractive if one looks for a position in between the two camps, because it can accommodate externalist and internalist intuitions: We may sometimes be entitled to a certain belief independently of our ability to o er a justi cation, whereas special circumstances may require us to give reasons in order to be entitled. Authors such as Fred Dretske, Tyler Burge, Peter Graham, Christopher Peacocke, Crispin Wright and Martin Davies have o ered original accounts of entitlement as a kind of epistemic status that comes with weaker internalist requirements than justi cation.
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Although these accounts di er in important respects, it is nevertheless possible to extract something like a common core, a "standard account" of epistemic entitlement.
Having summarized the standard account in section 1, I will argue (in section 2) that epistemic entitlements-just as other kinds of rightsshould meet an accessibility requirement: since someone's having a right to do something has consequences for how others are required to treat that person, entitlements have to be publicly accessible. After showing (in section 3) that entitlements as understood in the standard account have problems meeting this requirement, I present a social externalist alternative in section 4, according to which entitlements are grounded in a set of accepted default conditions. In sections 5 and 6 I discuss ways in which this account can deal with various objections driven by internalist intuitions.
e standard account of epistemic entitlement
Here is what I take to be the four central elements of the standard account of epistemic entitlement.
